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COMMENTS
GOVERNMENT AGENTS AND THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT RECONSIDERED
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977)
Where a government agent is present during a conference between an
accused and his attorney, the question has arisen whether such an intrusion
without more is in itself a violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel. '
The circuit courts of appeals have differed in their approaches to this
problem, with some circuits requiring in addition to the intrusion, a showing
of prejudice to the defendant, purposeful invasion of an attorney-client
conference, or "gross" misconduct by the government in order to establish
a violation of the sixth amendment.
In Weatherford v. Bursey,2 the United States Supreme Court held that
the sixth amendment's guarantee of the right to counsel is not violated when
a government agent3 is present during an attorney-client conference, so long
as: (1) the agent is not present for the purpose of gathering information; and
(2) no information is in fact communicated to the prosecution. The Court
rejected the view that such an intrusion is per se a violation of the sixth
amendment, regardless of intent or actual prejudice to the defendant, a view
that the Court had previously appeared to endorse.4
It is the purpose of this case comment to examine the impact of
Weatherford on the sixth amendment's protection of an accused criminal's
right to confer with counsel. The Court's holding and reasoning will be
evaluated in the context of other decisions by the Supreme Court and the
courts of appeals in similar cases.
1. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution states: "In all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
2. 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
3. For purposes of this case comment, the term "government agent" will denote one
who was an agent of the government at the time the intrusion occurred, as distinguished from
the case where a party not originally working for the government turns informer. This comment
will deal only with the former situation. See Comment, Present & Suggested Limitations on the
Use of Secret Agents and Informers in Law Enforcement, 41 COLO. L. REV. 261,272-73 (1969).
4. Although Weatherford was a civil suit for damages" the Court's analysis would seem
to apply in the criminal context as well. Vacation of a conviction is a remedy looked on with less
favor by courts than an award of damages. See United States v. Zarzour, 432 F.2d 1,3 (5th Cir.
1970). The Court's refusal to uphold an award of damages on the facts of Weatherford indicates
a fortiori that it would refuse to vacate a conviction in like circumstances.
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THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF WEATHERFORD V. BURSEy
5
Brett Bursey's trial and conviction for malicious damage to property
arose out of an incident when Bursey and others allegedly vandalized the
Richland County Selective Service Office in Columbia, South Carolina.
One of the participants in this act of vandalism was Jack Weatherford, an
undercover agent of the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division, who
arranged for his own and Bursey's arrests. Weatherford was assigned an
attorney by the Law Enforcement Division to preserve the secrecy of his
identity as a government agent. On at least two occasions, Weatherford
attended meetings between Bursey and Bursey's attorney at which the
upcoming trial was discussed.
The district court found that Weatherford's presence at these meetings
was for the purpose of maintaining his cover. The court also noted that he
did not initiate either meeting or seek to obtain information regarding
Bursey's trial plans for the purpose of passing it on to his superiors or the
prosecution.6 Although it was not originally intended that Weatherford
would testify at trial, his effectiveness as an undercover agent had been
diminished because he had been seen in the company of police officers. As a
result, it was decided on the morning of the trial that Weatherford would
testify. Totally unprepared for this eyewitness testimony, Bursey was found
guilty and sentenced to eighteen months in prison. Since Bursey went ahead
and served the prison term, he was no longer entitled to a direct appeal of his
case.7 Upon release from prison, however, Bursey filed an action under
section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act 8 against Weatherford and others,
alleging deprivation of his constitutional rights secured to him under the
fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendments.
9
The district court concluded that Bursey's rights had not been violated,
basing its decision on two grounds: (1) that the intrusion was not of a
"'gross" nature because it was not made with the intent to spy for the
5. 429 U.S. 547-50 (1977).
6. Bursey v. Weatherford, 528 F.2d 483, 485-86 (4th Cir. 1975) (the district court opinion
was not reported).
7. It is unclear why Bursey did not seek habeas corpus relief.
8. Section 1983, under which Bursey brought his action, provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage,
of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
9. U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI and XIV. Bursey also alleged that his fifth amendment
right to a fair trial had been denied by the prosecution's failure to disclose beforehand that
Weatherford would testify at trial.
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prosecution; and (2) that no prejudice resulted from the intrusion because no
information was, in fact, communicated to the prosecution. '
0
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed,' 1 holding that
"whenever the prosecution knowingly arranges or permits intrusion into the
attorney-client relationship the right to counsel is sufficiently endangered to
require reversal and a new trial." 12 The Fourth Circuit concluded that the
Supreme Court had established a rule that such intrusions automatically
violate a defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel. 13 The appellate
court rejected the prosecution's argument that "grossness" of the intrusion
was the test of a constitutional violation 14 and held that whether a constitu-
tional violation had occurred should instead turn upon whether the intrusion
was deliberate or inadvertent. 15 Under this test, so long as the intrusion is
knowingly committed or permitted, the fact that it was done without the
motive of obtaining trial-related information is irrelevant and a constitution-
al violation will be found.
In order to understand the significance of the Supreme Court's holding
in Weatherford, previous Supreme Court and circuit court decisions must
be considered. Consequently, before evaluating the Weatherford opinion,
past judicial treatment of similar sixth amendment cases will be surveyed.
SUPREME COURT PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Beginning in 1932 with Powell v. Alabama,16 where the right to
counsel was held applicable to the states through the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the right
to counsel is fundamental to the concept of due process. 17 Thus, the states
have been held required to supply counsel to indigents who are unable to
afford a lawyer' 8 and the right to counsel has been held to apply from the
moment an investigation begins to focus on a particular suspect. 19
Privacy of communication between an accused and his attorney has
been viewed as the essence of the right to counsel.2' The rationale for
regarding privacy of communication as an element of the constitutional
10. See 528 F.2d at 486 for a discussion of the unpublished district court decision.
11. Id. at 485.
12. Id. at 486.
13. Id. at 486-87.
14. Id. at 486.
15. Id.
16. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). See generally Brewer v. Williams, 97 S. Ct. 1232, 1239 (1977), and
cases cited therein.
17. 287 U.S. at 67-68.
18. Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
19. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
20. United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 950
(1974).
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guarantee is similar to the rationale underlying the common law evidentiary
privilege by which a client may prevent his lawyer from testifying to
statements made by the client in the course of the professional relation-
ship.'21 The privilege is thought to promote the full disclosure by a client to
his attorney necessary to effective representation. Intrusion into the attor-
ney-client relationship is not itself of constitutional dimension but it be-
comes so when the intrusion is committed or induced by a. state or federal
government agent.
22
In contrast to this evidentiary privilege, which is considered waived as
to statements made in the presence of a third party, 23 waiver of the constitu-
tional right to counsel must conform to the standard set forth by the Supreme
Court in Johnson v. Zerbst.24 That case presented a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus by a prisoner who had been tried and convicted without
representation by a lawyer. In response to the contention that the petitioner
had waived his right to counsel by appearing for himself, the Court held that
a waiver is "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right" 25 and, hence, must be -made "competently and intelligently."
' 26
While the Supreme Court has held that the fourth amendment proscription
against unreasonable searches and seizures does not protect against procure-
ment of evidence by use of government agents,27 it has never held that the
sixth amendment right to counsel is waived where an agent is present at an
attorney-client conference.
The Supreme Court addressed the problem of government intrusion
into defense conferences in only a few cases before Weatherford.28 T ose
cases seemed to indicate, however, that the Supreme Court had endorsed the
principle enunciated by the Fourth Circuit in Weatherford29 that the pres-
ence of a government agent at a defense conference constitutes a per se
constitutional violation.
The Fourth Circuit relied on Black v. United States30 and O'Brien v.
United States31 in support of this view. Both cases involved electronic
21. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, §§ 87-97 (2d ed. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK].
22. See 485 F.2d at 1227.
23. McCORMICK, supra note 21, at 194.
24. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
25. Id. at 464.
26. Id. at 468.
27. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303 (1966).
28. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); O'Brien v. United States, 386 U.S.
345 (1967); Black v. United States, 385 U.S. 26 (1966); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293
(1966); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
29. 528 F.2d at 486.
30. 385 U.S. 26 (1966).
31. 386 U.S. 345 (1967).
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monitoring of conversations between an accused and his attorney. In both
cases, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that a hearing should be
held to determine whether the defendant had been prejudiced by the inter-
ception and instead vacated the judgment and remanded for a new trial.
Justice Harlan dissented in both cases 32 on the ground that no use had been
made by the prosecution of the intercepted material in either conviction.
Harlan argued that the only way to justify vacating these convictions was by
a rule that any governmental activity of this kind automatically vitiates a
conviction. Since no such rule had ever been established and since this point
had not been briefed or argued in these cases, Harlan argued that the Court's
decisions were inappropriate.
However, the two decisions were interpreted by the Fourth Circuit in
Weatherford to stand for the proposition that Justice Harlan had disclaimed;
that governmental interference with the attorney-client relationship automat-
ically calls for a conviction obtained in such circumstances to be vacated.
Such a reading of Black and O'Brien was not unreasonable, particularly in
light of an earlier pronouncement by the Court in Glasser v. United States
33
that "[t]he right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and
absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of
prejudice arising from its denial."
34
The Supreme Court's next confrontation with the problem of govern-
ment intrusion into a defense conference came in Hoffa v. United States,35
where the alleged interference was by the agent's presence rather than by
electronic means. In a previous trial, known as the Test Fleet trial, James
Hoffa, then president of the Teamsters Union, had been charged with
violation of the Taft-Hartley Act. 36 During the course of the Test Fleet trial,
Ed Partin, a Teamsters Union official, had become a confidante of Hoffa's.
Partin had been present at conferences between Hoffa and his attorneys. He
had also been present at other conferences between Hoffa and third parties
who were not lawyers where the bribing of jurors allegedly was discussed.
Partin relayed the contents of these discussions to federal agents and after
the first trial resulted in a hung jury, Hoffa was indicted and convicted of
jury-tampering on the basis of Partin's testimony.
37
The Supreme Court held that the use of incriminating statements
obtained in this manner did not violate Hoffa's constitutional rights. 38 The
32. See 385 U.S. at 29-31; 386 U.S. at 345-47.
33. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
34. Id. at 76.
35. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
36. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-179 (1970).
37, United States v. Hoffa, 349 F.2d 20 (6th Cir. 1965).
38. 385 U.S. at 301-03.
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use of informers was held not to be unconstitutional in itself on the theory
that the fourth amendment does not protect against misplaced trust in a
confidante. 39 The sixth amendment claim that the government, through
Partin, had intruded upon the attorney-client relationship was disposed of on
the ground that, assuming arguendo that the right to counsel was violated in
the Test Fleet trial, evidence obtained thereby was not rendered inadmissible
in a different trial for a separate offense.4'
After Hoffa it was clear that the use of secret agents, even those
equipped with recording devices,41 did not violate the fourth amendment.
However, Hoffa appeared to leave undisturbed the apparent rule of Black
and O'Brien that intrusion by a government agent into an attorney-client
conference would violate the sixth amendment.
Hoffa seemed distinguishable from Black and O'Brien in two re-
spects. First, in Hoffa the Court had based its conclusion that no violation of
Hoffa's right to counsel had occurred because the infiltration of Hoffa's
defense had occurred in a previous trial, the Test Fleet trial, for a separate
offense than the one at bar.4 2 Second, the Hoffa opinion distinguished two
earlier cases, Coplon v. United States43 and Caldwell v. United States, 44 in
which the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia had held that
intrusion by a government agent into an attorney-client conference, even
without a further showing of prejudice, requires vacation of a conviction. In
Hoffa the Court viewed Coplon and Caldwell as concerning "government
intrusion of the grossest kind." 4 5 The implication was that the sixth amend-
ment would be violated by an agent's intrusion into a defense conference,
even without a showing of resulting prejudice to the defendant, at least
where government misconduct was particularly egregious or "gross."
Hoffa, together with Black and O'Brien, could be read, as the Fourth
Circuit had read them, as establishing that the sixth amendment is violated
by the presence of a government agent at a defense conference regardless of
intent or prejudice to the defendant. Yet the other courts of appeals have
employed different approaches in similar cases.
THE COURTS OF APPEALS
A Per Se Rule
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Coplon and
Caldwell established a rule that such intrusion per se violates the sixth
39. Id.
40. Id. at 307-09.
41. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 748-54 (1971).
42. 385 U.S. at 304-09.
43. 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cel. denied, 342 U.S. 926 (1952).
44. 205 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
45. 385 U.S. at 306.
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amendment. 46 Coplon involved interception of phone calls between an
accused and his attorney by government agents. The appellate court vacated
the conviction despite the undisturbed finding by the district court that no
evidence used to convict the defendant was derived from the intercepted
conversations. In so doing, the court rejected the contention that denial of
the right to counsel should be dependent upon a showing of prejudice
resulting from the intrusion.
47
Caldwell involved intrusion by the presence of a government agent at
several defense conferences rather than by electronic means, as in Coplon.
Relying on Coplon, the appellate court vacated the conviction. The court
reasoned that intrusion by the physical presence of an agent was not
distinguishable from intrusion by electronic means and that, in both in-
stances, actual prejudice need not be shown in order to entitle a defendant to
a new trial. 48
A rule akin to a per se rule was adopted by a Colorado district court in
United States v. Orman .9 Orman concerned a motion to dismiss an indict-
ment for distributing heroin. The defendant alleged that government agents
had eavesdropped on her conferences with her lawyers. While the court
viewed prejudice to the defendant as an element of a constitutional viola-
tion, it reasoned that "where there is surveillance of attorney-client confer-
ences, prejudice must be presumed. . .. "50 The court held that this pre-
sumption was not overcome and the motion for dismissal was granted.
51
Orman rejected "grossness" of intrusion as the test for a constitutional
violation.
52
A test only slightly less protective of sixth amendment rights was
established by the Third Circuit in Via v. Cliff.53 That case was an action for
damages under the Civil Rights Act. 54 The plaintiff alleged that his consulta-
tions with his attorney while in jail awaiting trial had been deliberately
obstructed and cut short by jail officials. The court held that if the officials'
interference was either wrongfully motivated or without adequate justifica-
tion, the plaintiff had established infringement of his constitutional right to
counsel and need not additionally prove resultant prejudice.
55
46. See text accompanying notes 43-44 supra.
47. 191 F.2d at 759.
48. 205 F.2d at 881.
49. 417 F. Supp. 1126 (D. Colo. 1976). The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in
which Colorado is located, has not addressed the issue.
50. Id. at 1133.
51. Id. at 1138.
52. Id. at 1136.
53. 470 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1972).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
55. 470 F.2d at 275.
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The More Restrictive View
A more restrictive view of the sixth amendment's protection was taken
by the Second, Fifth and Eighth Circuits which adopted substantially the
same test.56 In these circuits, prejudice would generally have to be demon-
strated to warrant a new trial, unless government misconduct was sufficient-
ly "gross". It follows that misconduct could serve as an alternate basis for
granting a new trial and a showing of prejudice to the defendant would not
be required.
The Second Circuit held in United States v. Mosca,5 that, absent a
showing of prejudice to the defendant, the government's conduct in permit-
ting a co-defendant to participate in conferences with other criminal defend-
ants after the co-defendant had begun to cooperate with the government did
not warrant automatic reversal. 58 The court noted that the government made
no attempt to procure testimony from the co-defendant regarding conversa-
tions overheard by him subsequent to his decision to cooperate. 59 This lack
of motive to interfere with counsel was an important element in the court's
decision.
In United States v. Rosner,6" the Second Circuit further acknowledged
in dicta that some circumstances, apparently depending on the seriousness
of government misconduct, could invoke a per se rule that a new trial should
be granted. 61 In Rosner, the court refused to grant a new trial where a co-
defendant who had turned informer had participated in pre-trial strategy
discussions with the defendant and his counsel. No evidence was offered
that the agent had communicated information obtained from these conversa-
tions to the government. While rejecting application of a per se rule, the
court acknowledged that such a rule existed and could be appropriately
invoked in the case of "intrusions of the grossest kind.''62
The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Zarzour,63 stated in dicta that a
new trial is required where government intrusion into a defense conference
is by "gross" misconduct, even absent prejudice to the defendant. 6M Absent
such a "gross" intrusion, however, prejudice to the defendant would have
to be proved in order to establish a constitutional violation. Moreover, the
56. See text accompanying notes 57-69 infra.
57. 475 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 948 (1973).
58. Id. at 1060-61.
59. Id.
60. 485 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir.- 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 950 (1974).
61. Id. at 1226-27.
62. Id. at 1223-26.
63. 432 F.2d I (5th Cir. 1970).
64. Id. at 3.
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court in Zarzour emphasized the requirement of prejudice by defining
"intrusion" to include use by the prosecution of information obtained
thereby.65
In South Dakota v. Long,66 a habeas corpus proceeding by state
prisoners, the Eighth Circuit stated in dicta that no prejudice would have to
be shown to establish a constitutional violation if the intrusion were suffi-
ciently "gross.'"67 At the preliminary hearing in the original case, one of the
prosecuting attorneys was seen holding a microphone so as to record a
conference between defendants and their attorney. Since this intrusion was
in open court and in plain view of the judge, counsel and the defendants, the
intrusion was held not to have risen to the level of surreptitious intrusion
which would require vacation of defendant's conviction, absent a showing
of prejudice.
68
In United States v. Dodge,69 the Eighth Circuit reaffirmed its conclu-
sion in Long that prejudice to the defendant was required absent a showing
of "gross" government misconduct. 70 In Dodge, cases arising from occu-
pation by the American Indian Movement of government buildings in
Wounded Knee, South Dakota were consolidated on appeal. The defendants
alleged, inter alia, that their right to counsel had been violated because
undercover agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation had had access to
the legal files of defendants' attorneys and because the government was
guilty of "gross" misconduct. The Eighth Circuit upheld the convictions on
the ground that there was no evidence that any agent was present when
defense strategy relating to the defendants was discussed or that defense
strategy was communicated. 7 Hence, there was no prejudice to the defend-
ants.
In United States v. Balistrieri,72 the Seventh Circuit, without examin-
ing approaches taken by other circuits, also took a restrictive view of the
sixth amendment's protection. In this case, the court indicated that govern-
mental intrusion into a defense conference must be with the purpose of
interfering with the right to counsel or must in fact produce evidence used at
trial in order for there to be a sixth amendment violation. 73 Appealing from
65. Id. at 3-5.
66. 465 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub nom., Hale v. South Dakota, 409 U.S.
1130 (1973).
67. Id. at 72.
68. Id.
69. 538 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1976).
70. Id. at 777-78.
71. Id. at 776-79.
72. 403 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1968), vacated on other grounds, 395 U.S. 710 (1969), 436 F.2d
1212 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 953 (1971).
73. Id. at 478.
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his conviction for income tax evasion, the defendant in Balistrieri alleged
that eavesdropping on the office of one of his attorneys constituted interfer-
ence by the government with his right to counsel. The court affirmed the
conviction on the ground that nothing supported the allegation that the
purpose of the surveillance was to gain information relating to trial strat-
egy. 74 The court also emphasized that since the eavesdropping was disclosed
before conviction, the case could be distinguished from O'Brien. 
75
THE SUPREME COURT'S TEST
Under the Supreme Court's test a defendant would apparently be
required to show one of the following in order to establish a constitutional
violation by government intrusion into an attorney-client conference: "taint-
ed evidence . . ., communication of defense strategy to the prosecution
. or purposeful intrusion, i.e., with intent to gather trial-related infor-
mation for the prosecution.' '76 The Court did not expressly adopt the
approach of any of the circuit courts of appeals and, in fact, the Court's
approach is distinct from that of any prior case. The Court's position may be
seen as lying between those decisions espousing a per se test, and thus
protective of sixth amendment rights, and those decisions requiring preju-
dice to be shown. Under the Court's test, if either purposeful intrusion or
communication to the prosecution could be proven, then a further showing
that such activity actually prejudiced the defendant's case would not be
necessary. Since a case where such governmental activity could occur
without actually prejudicing a defendant is unlikely to arise, the Court's
position is actually close to those cases requiring that prejudice must be
shown to establish a constitutional violation. The opinion does not expressly
consider "grossness" of government conduct as a basis for overturning a
conviction. However, there is no indication that the Court supports this
view.
Citing its long-standing recognition of the need for undercover activi-
ty, 77 the Court declined to adopt a per se rule, reasoning that such a rule
would compel a government agent to refuse to participate in an attorney-
client conference even if invited, thereby effectively revealing his identity as
a government agent. 78 The court denied that it had already established a per
74. Id. at 477-78.
75. Id. at 478.
76. 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
77. Id. at 556-59. The cases cited by the Court as supporting the need for undercover
agents are not entirely on point. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,432 (1973); Lewis v.
United States, 385 U.S. 206, 208-09 (1966). It was not the need for undercover agents which was
in dispute in Weatherford but whether that need must yield where it conflicts with the right to
counsel. The right to counsel was not at issue in the cases cited by the Court.
78. 429 U.S. at 556.
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se rule in Black and O'Brien, as the Fourth Circuit had concluded.7 9 Black
and O'Brien were distinguished on the ground that the results in those cases
could have been reached by reliance on well settled fourth amendment
grounds and that it was not clear that those cases involved the sixth
amendment.80 The Court denied that Hoffa had indicated any acceptance of
the approach taken in Caldwell and Coplon, pointing out that in Hoffa it
had only assumed, without deciding, that Caldwell and Coplon had been
correctly decided.
81
The Court made clear that it regarded interception of attorney-client
communications by an undercover agent as less offensive to the sixth
amendment than interception by electronic means, 82 despite the contrary
conclusion in Caldwell.8 3 The Court reasoned that a client's willingness to
communicate freely with his attorney is chilled less by a fear that a third
party may turn out to be a government agent than by a fear that the
government is electronically monitoring conversations. 4 This is so, in the
Court's view, because the former intrusion may be avoided by excluding
third parties from defense conferences or by refraining from disclosing
defense strategy when third parties are present at these meetings.
85
A CRITIQUE OF THE SUPREME COURT'S TEST
The Court's conclusion and its reasoning constitute an unsatisfactory
solution to the problem of accommodating governmental use of undercover
agents with the sixth amendment's guarantees. The decision is unsatisfac-
tory in that it invites abuse by prosecutors because of the difficulty an
accused will now have in establishing a constitutional violation.
Under the Court's test, any intrusion by a government agent into a
defense conference is presumed harmless and the burden of showing other-
wise is on the defendant. A defendant would apparently be required to show
subjective intent to gather trial-related information or actual communication
of such information to the prosecution in order to establish a constitutional
violation. This test will be difficult to meet. Intent to gather information for
the prosecution would be virtually impossible to prove unless, for example,
an incriminating memorandum could be found containing a record of such
instructions. It is unlikely that such a memorandum would exist.
79. Id. at 550-54.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 553-55.
82. Id. at 554-55, n.4.
83. 205 F.2d at 381.
84. 429 U.S. at 554-55, n.4.
85. Id.
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Communication of information to the prosecution could be proven if
the prosecution used evidence at trial that it could only have obtained
through an undercover agent. However, if the only evidence used at trial
could have been obtained by other means, communication of trial-related
information probably could not be proven. Thus, an unfair advantage might
accrue to a prosecution team who had in fact obtained useful information
through intrusion upon a trial strategy conference but whose misconduct
could not be proven because of the difficulty of meeting the requirements
imposed by Weatherford.
Moreover, the Court's definition of "communication of defense strat-
egy' 86 does not include the situation where the agent himself testifies for the
prosecution, as happened in Weatherford. Yet, as Justice Marshall pointed
out in his dissent, "[i]f, for example, agent Weatherford had learned that
Bursey would use an entrapment defense, Weatherford could have planned
his testimony so as to minimize his own role in the vandalism and to
emphasize Bursey's predisposition to the crime." 87 Assuming that the
prosecution is aided by such testimony, it seems inaccurate to hold that
nothing has been "communicated" to the prosecution.
Similarly, where the defendant's case has been damaged by govern-
ment intrusion, it makes little sense to deny the harm done to the defendant
on the ground that aiding the prosecution was not the purpose of the
intrusion. A requirement of intent seems contrary to the principle, settled
since Monroe v. Pape,88 that specific intent to deprive a person of constitu-
tional rights is not a requisite of a constitutional violation. 89 The Court
cursorily acknowledged and dismissed the argument that the elements of
subjective intent or actual communication will be difficult to prove or that
prosecutors are prone to lie. 9 Because the Court's test would make lying
virtually impossible to prove, the Court's faith seems unrealistic.
A BETTER TEST
A solution more consonant with the Court's avowed commitment to
protecting the right to counsel9 would have been adoption of a rule that the
presence of a government agent in a conference between an accused and his
attorney is presumptively violative of the sixth amendment. 2 If the prosecu-
tion could then demonstrate some justification for extending undercover
86. Id. at 557-59.
87. Id. at 564, n. I (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
88. 365 U.S. 167, 187 (961).
89. Accord, Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228, 1232-33 (4th Cir. 1970); Basista v. Weir,
340 F.2d 74, 81 (3d Cir. 1965).
90. 429 U.S. at 556-57.
91. See generally Brewer v. Williams, 97 S. Ct. 1232, 1239 (1977), and cases cited therein.
/ 92. This is essentially the test proposed in United States v. Ormen, 417 F. Supp. 1126 (D.
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activities past the time of arrest, in addition to meeting Weatherford's
requirements that there was no purposeful intrusion and no communication
to the prosecution, a holding that the sixth amendment had not been violated
would be more justified.
The Court's rationale for rejecting a rule that government intrusion per
se violates the sixth amendment was that such a rule would, in effect,
require an agent to reveal his identity, thus destroying his efficacy as an
agent. 93 However, assuming that there may be instances where an agent
must maintain his cover beyond the time of indictment, there is no require-
ment under Weatherford that the prosecution make a showing of such need.
In Weatherford, in fact, there was no justification for the agent's continued
secrecy after Bursey's indictment. Had Weatherford earlier revealed his
identity as an undercover agent, his usefulness in future assignments would
indeed have been impaired as to those familiar with his role in Bursey's
case. However, such impairment was inevitable, because placing Wea-
therford on the stand in the role of a defendant would have constituted a
fraud upon the court.' As for those not familiar with Bursey's case,
Weatherford's effectiveness might not have been impaired at all.
A rule that government intrusion into a defense conference is presump-
tively unconstitutional would provide for those occasions where use of
undercover agents past the time of arrest is justified by exigent circum-
stances, such as where a possibility exists that revelation of the agent's
identity will endanger his life or jeopardize any ongoing investigations.
95
Thus, this test would be more accommodating to the use of undercover
agents by police forces, which the Court has repeatedly recognized as
necessary,' than a rule that government intrusion into a defense conference
per se warrants a new trial. A presumption that such activity is unconstitu-
tional would be more protective of the right to counsel than the Court's
solution. The result would be a prophylactic rule excluding use of evidence
obtained through violation of the right to counsel with allowance made for
circumstances where intrusion was unavoidable but not actually prejudicial
to the fairness of the defendant's trial.
Such a prophylactic rule needs to be adopted for the same reason that
the fourth amendment exclusionary rule evolved. That rule excludes use at
Colo. 1976), where the court held that prejudice would be rebuttably presumed. See text
accompanying note 49 supra.
93. 429 U.S. at 556-57.
94. United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1227 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 950
(1974).
95. These are the examples offered by Justice Marshall who argued in his dissent that
there was no need for Weatherford's services as an undercover agent to have continued after
Bursey's indictment. 97 S. Ct. at 849 n.5 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
96. See note 69 supra.
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trial of improperly obtained evidence in violation of the fourth amend-
ment. 97 The rationale for that rule is the belief that if law enforcement
officers know that violation of the fourth amendment will not benefit them,
they will be deterred from unconstitutional conduct.
The absence of a similar rule that intrusion into a defense conference
presumptively violates the sixth amendment ensures that there will be such
intrusions. An agent who attends a defense conference can be of great help
to the prosecution, if only through his own testimony at trial, as in Wea-
therford. Hence, the government will now have an incentive to maintain
agents in their undercover roles past the time when they have completed
their legitimate duty of contributing to the arrest of criminals.
Where there are exigent circumstances making continued secrecy rea-
sonable and an agent has no choice but to attend a defense conference, the
continued secrecy seems justifiable only so long as the need for it continues.
However, an agent who has been privy to such meetings should not be
permitted to testify at trial.
Although attempts at infiltration of an attorney-client conference could
be defeated by an attorney who investigates each of his clients to determine
if he is a government agent, this will not always be done. Since such
infiltration after trial preparation has commenced seems beyond the scope of
duty of law enforcement officers, the extra burden placed on the accused
and his counsel of ensuring the bona fides of all persons concerned seems
unjustifiable.
CONCLUSION
Weatherford v. Bursey takes its place among those recent cases which
have constricted the scope of constitutional guarantees.98 While the Wea-
therford requirement of a showing of purposeful intrusion or communica-
tion is ostensibly more protective of sixth amendment rights than those
circuits which required an actual showing of prejudice in order to establish a
sixth amendment violation, in effect the Court's test is equally burdensome.
While the Court's rejection of a per se rule requiring a new trial was
arguably justifiable, the Court failed to fully explore alternative approaches,
such as a rule that government intrusion into a defense conference would
presumptively violate the sixth amendment.
After Weatherford, the sixth amendment offers little protection against
government intrusion into conferences between an accused and his attorney.
97. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
98. See generally, Brennan, State Constitutions & Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARv. L. REV. 489 (1977); Miles, The Ailing Fourth Amendment: A Suggested Cure, 63
A.B.A.J. 365 (1977).
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The obstacles erected by the Court to use of the sixth amendment to protect
against such intrusion will rarely be surmounted. Since this result is as
apparent to prosecutors as it is to defense attorneys, the potential for abuse
of the Court's ruling is great.
Weatherford puts a gloss on the sixth amendment which limits its
protection to the wary and the skillful. Those criminal defendants and their
lawyers who are able to prevent government intrusion or who are able to
meet the test imposed by Weatherford may still seek vindication of their
rights through the sixth amendment. For all others, the scope of the sixth
amendment's protection has been restricted.
ScoTt M. BELLER

